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THE ALLOCATION OF JAMES RIVER LIVING MARINE RESOURCES

INTRODUCTION
Man has traditionally considered oceanic resources as infinite
and conmon property.

The philosophy supported by this concept

is, "get what you can, before someone else does," the "Tragedy
of the Commons."

This is exploitation as opposed to management.

The concept of resource management is to provide rewards, be
they the social pleasure of catching or the economic profit
of selling the captured resource, to as large a segment of the
population as possible, over as long a period as possible.
Management of living marine and estuarine resources is still
a new endeavor, in spite of the age of the agencies.

The

ocean was not "managed" until 1976 with the passage of the
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 which gave
the United States exclusive resburce jurisdiction from 3
to 200 n. miles offshore.

This act was the result df foreign

and domestic fishing pressure on the stocks which brought
subsequent pressure on the politicians who in return reacted
by passing legislation.

As the finite limit of the resource

was reached the less able to compete (the American fisherman)
used political power to equalize the balance of power thro~gh
legislation and realized a greater share of the allocation.
These problems of open ocean and shelf resource allocation,
while complicated are dwarfed in comparison to the allocation
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problems of coastal living resources that move freely across
state boundaries, and are subjected to differing management
regimes as they do so.

The James River is a microcosm of the

coastal Mid-Atlantic estuarine ecosystem, with all the
attendent pressures on the resources.
Allocation between man and resource
The pressure on each finite.resource is directly proportional
to the proximity of man.

In an area such as the James River

the living marine resource must share with man not only
its own biomass, but its resource, the water it lives in, its
. environment .
The allocation of this riverine environment between man's uses
and the River's inhabitants is often a socio-economic judgement
by

regulatory agencies, hut

decision.

cts

often as not, a political

Man competes both for space and the water.

Once

through cooling, marina '·s sewage pathogens, chlorination,
purposeful or accidental discharges of oil, herbicides,
pesticides and fertilizers all reduce the quality of the
resources' environment.
Allocation of resources between man
Just as he does on the ocean, man sets against man in the
James for allocation of the finite resource.

Competition

for access to the resources, living and min.eral is keen.
Sand, gravel and oyster shell are three mineral resources that
are vital to tidewater economy.

Their stewardship, maintained
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by the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, is often a
difficult one as they must be allocated between those
desiring to mine them from the state owned sub-aqueous lands.
Not only is access to state owned subaqueous mineral resources
a growing concern; but so to is access by the public to the
shore.

Ownership of the la~ds above the highwater mark, or

vegetated wetlands, presupposes control of access.

It is

therefore possible to predict the eventuality of no public
access to the shore except where Federal, State, or local
government provide and maintain it at tax payers expense.
as at many such "public ownerships" a fee is charged.
beach may remain free, but not so the right-of-way.

Or,

The
Today,

however, I want to focus on the shellfish, the oyster and
hard clam, on ownership of state river bottom, on how to
harvest ~he resource, and on who is permitted to harvest it.

Let us consider the three most controversial-areas.
James River Seed Oyster
Currently, 75% of the seed oyster in Virginia comes from the
public oyster rocks in the lower James.

State law currently

allows their harvest by hand tong only.

The tonger sells to

a "buyboat" or trucker (broker) on shore, each man tonging
50-100 bushels a day.

These seed are sold to private planters

to "plant" on their river leases.

If the MRC wishes to
\i.,

obtain seed from the James to rehabitate
or replete depleted
,..
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public oyster rock they must have the watermen obtain. the
seed.

Generally they pay an agreed upon sum per bushel and

have the ~onged seed loaded on a leased or chartered boat
(or truck) to transport to the selected public rock.
The most economic procedure would be to harves: the seed by
dredge, selling some to private lease holders and planting
the rest on public bottom.

This would lower the cost of

seed, perhaps from $2.50/Bu to .60-.70/Bu.

A third alternative

is to make some of the less productive rocks or those too deep
to tong available to private concerns so they can produce
their own seed at a considerable saving.
Studies have shown that the major loss in Virginia oyster
production since 1960 has been from the private sector while

constant.

To rebuild the Virginia oyster industry then we

need to make low cost seed·available to the private grower.
But what will this reallocation do to the waterman, already
hurt by Kepone and steady oyster prices during a period
of raising operating costs.
The decision is up. to the General Assembly.
Unassigned bottom
There are 2],841 acres of public oyster ground (Baylor Bottom)
and about 15,000 acres of leased bottom in the James River.
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In addition, there is large acrage of unassigned bottom, of this,
some 20,000 acres are below the James River Bridge and produce
hard clams.

These higher salinity unassigned grounds with

the oyster disease MSX that makes them unattractive to lease
and grow out market oysters, are ideal hard clams.

These

unassigned grounds can be leased for hard clam harvest or even
culture at $1. 50/ acre/year.

They are currently worked

by watermen using patent tongs.
when they are leased.

They are lost to the watermen

Another alternative is to set them

aside as "public clam grounds."

The decision as to the allocation

of these clam grounds is up to the MRC.
and how much?

Who will get what,

Or, will the General Assembly be pressured, as

it is now to stop the private leasing.
The Hydraulic Dredge
The question of leasing state bottom £or clam harvest is more
comple:{ then simply who gets the use of the bottom.

On

Hampton Bar in the Lower James where.some 1,800 acres of
"unassigned ground" were leased last fall and a permit issued
to use a hydraulic escalator dredge for th·e taking of clams.

This

gear, which is seven times more efficient than the patent tong,
was opposed by the watermen in mass at the MRC and in the
halls of the General Assembly.
Here the question of resource allocation raised a new
consideration.
take it.

Not who gets it, but how will he be allowed to

To keep the watermen competitive the lease holder
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may not use his efficient dredge, he too must use the patent
tong, or so Senate Bill 60 will stipulate.

S. B. 60 will

make illegal the use of the hydraulic dredge for the harvest
of hard clams even on leased bottom.

.A legislative aliocation

from industry pressure.
The Question
The examples posed here do not answer the question of who
receives the allocation nor who shall make them.

It raises

the larger question, how do we decide who get the resource?

What shall our criterial be?

Virginia's unwritten resource

policy is legislation enforcing inefficiency of harvest by

restricting new techniques thereby not harvesting above the
maximum sustainable yield, but more importantly, not permitting
efficient/effective harvest techniques to put anyone out of
work.

This policy insures the watermen an allocation of the

finite resource.

Othere states do not allocate shellfish

resources among harvesters with the exception of Maryland
and its sail powered Skipjack.

The Skipjack, a sailboat

can only, on certain days of the week, tow an oyster dredge
while under sail.

Can Virginia continue its policy of

enforced inefficiency in an inflationary economy?

Must we

move to the more modern, efficient techniques, allowing

increased production, but with the resultant erosion of the
waterman.

Can we afford not to, can we afford to.

